Causal Explanation and Moral Judgement: Undividing a Division

Allbwn ymchwil: Cyfraniad at gyfnodolynErthygladolygiad gan gymheiriaid

12 Dyfyniadau(SciVal)

Crynodeb

By combining arguments about causal explanation in history found in the writings of Veyne and Dray, this article discusses one plausible line of reasoning which suggests that there is a type of causal explanation which historians offer to which their moral judgements are conceptually integral. It assesses the validity of this line of thinking and suggests that the reason why, in some cases, our moral judgements seep through to our causal explanations is not that certain concepts, such as, in particular, passivity and activity of the key actors’ acts, used in our causal narratives, necessarily involve moral judgements for their application, but rather that any explanation is an answer to a question and some causal questions turn out to be, or may plausibly be construed as, asking for our moral views. The ‘intrusion’ of moral judgement into causal explanation is not logically necessary, but may be contextually appropriate in some cases.
Iaith wreiddiolSaesneg
Tudalennau (o-i)717-734
Nifer y tudalennau18
CyfnodolynMillennium: Journal of International Studies
Cyfrol39
Rhif cyhoeddi3
Dyddiad ar-lein cynnar24 Maw 2011
Dynodwyr Gwrthrych Digidol (DOIs)
StatwsCyhoeddwyd - 16 Mai 2011

Ôl bys

Gweld gwybodaeth am bynciau ymchwil 'Causal Explanation and Moral Judgement: Undividing a Division'. Gyda’i gilydd, maen nhw’n ffurfio ôl bys unigryw.

Dyfynnu hyn