Oleg Penkovsky, British Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis

Allbwn ymchwil: Pennod mewn Llyfr/Adroddiad/Trafodion CynhadleddPennod


This chapter contributes to a collection that assesses cases studies in British intelligence and explores what broader lessons for understanding the role of intelligence can be learned. It provides a systematic and authoritative analysis of the role of Penkovsky based on analysis of British and American primary sources. It illuminates problems in interpretation of intelligence documentation, and some of the challenges facing those conducting operations and analysis. It demonstrates the challenges of reliance on only one source of intelligence. It is based on primary sources and provides an original interpretation. It is rigorous in historical method. Ranking: 3*
Iaith wreiddiolSaesneg
TeitlLearning from the Secret Past: Cases in British Intelligence History
GolygyddionRobert Dover , Michael Goodman
Man cyhoeddiWashington D.C.
CyhoeddwrGeorgetown University Press
Nifer y tudalennau31
ISBN (Argraffiad)978-1-58901-770-2
StatwsCyhoeddwyd - 2011

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