The other side of the COIN: minimum and exemplary force in British Army counter-insurgency in Kenya

Huw Charles Bennett

Allbwn ymchwil: Cyfraniad at gyfnodolynErthygladolygiad gan gymheiriaid

70 Dyfyniadau(SciVal)

Crynodeb

This article argues that the British government's deliberate exclusion of international law from colonial counterinsurgencies allowed the army to suppress opponents with little restraint. The oft-assumed national inhibitor, the principle of ‘minimum force’, was actually widely permissive. As a result exemplary force was employed to coerce the Kikuyu civilian population in Kenya into supporting the government rather than the insurgents. Apparently random acts were thus strategic, and emerged in three forms: beatings and torture, murders, and forced population movement. The article argues that such harsh measures were seen as necessary and effective; they were a form of indirect policy and did not arise from a disciplinary breakdown.
Iaith wreiddiolSaesneg
Tudalennau (o-i)638-664
Nifer y tudalennau26
CyfnodolynSmall Wars and Insurgencies
Cyfrol18
Rhif cyhoeddi4
Dynodwyr Gwrthrych Digidol (DOIs)
StatwsCyhoeddwyd - 2007

Ôl bys

Gweld gwybodaeth am bynciau ymchwil 'The other side of the COIN: minimum and exemplary force in British Army counter-insurgency in Kenya'. Gyda’i gilydd, maen nhw’n ffurfio ôl bys unigryw.

Dyfynnu hyn