This thesis explores the British government’s approach to international negotiations concerning nuclear weapons during Harold Wilson’s first two terms of office (1964-1970). It focuses on three distinct but interrelated strands of British nuclear diplomacy: ‘hardware solutions’, the sharing of nuclear weapons between states in the form of a multilateral force; ‘software solutions’, non-physical measures of cooperation, such as consultative and planning arrangements, between alliance members; and a global non-proliferation treaty. In looking at how and why these interrelated policies evolved, this thesis considers party, domestic and international influences on decision-making within the government. It pays particular attention to political and economic events, building on existing diplomatic and strategic accounts of the period.
Dyddiad Dyfarnu | 21 Rhag 2010 |
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Iaith wreiddiol | Saesneg |
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Sefydliad Dyfarnu | |
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Goruchwyliwr | Len Scott (Goruchwylydd) & Andrew John Priest (Goruchwylydd) |
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Wilson and the Bomb: The politics and economics of British nuclear diplomacy 1964-1970
Gill, D. J. (Awdur). 21 Rhag 2010
Traethawd ymchwil myfyriwr: Traethawd Ymchwil Doethurol › Doethur mewn Athroniaeth