Minimum Deterrence: A Force Posture for the Twenty-First Century

Kristan Stoddart

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference Proceeding (Non-Journal item)

Abstract

What follows is not intended to create a straw man. It is a considered attempt to flesh out a concept which invites debate and which could, if twinned with bilateral and multilateral arms control negotiations, produce lower levels of mutual deterrence for the nuclear weapons states and for the United States and Russia in particular. It could also induce greater confidence amongst the non-nuclear weapons states that Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is being taken seriously; a persistent charge levelled by Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). This could also have positive strategic benefits as well as reduce the economic costs of the stockpile of the world’s two nuclear superpowers. It will first make a case for lower levels of ‘minimum deterrence’ between the United States and Russia and put forward reasons for a gradual move to a single nuclear platform – the SSBN – alongside a considered arms control agenda.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProject on Nuclear Issues
Subtitle of host publicationA Collection of Papers from the 2008 Conference Series
EditorsMark Jansson
PublisherCenter for Strategic and International Studies
Pages17-28
Number of pages12
Publication statusPublished - 01 Apr 2009

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