Oleg Penkovsky, British Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter


This chapter contributes to a collection that assesses cases studies in British intelligence and explores what broader lessons for understanding the role of intelligence can be learned. It provides a systematic and authoritative analysis of the role of Penkovsky based on analysis of British and American primary sources. It illuminates problems in interpretation of intelligence documentation, and some of the challenges facing those conducting operations and analysis. It demonstrates the challenges of reliance on only one source of intelligence. It is based on primary sources and provides an original interpretation. It is rigorous in historical method. Ranking: 3*
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLearning from the Secret Past: Cases in British Intelligence History
EditorsRobert Dover , Michael Goodman
Place of PublicationWashington D.C.
PublisherGeorgetown University Press
Number of pages31
ISBN (Print)978-1-58901-770-2
Publication statusPublished - 2011


  • intelligence, Penkovsky, missiles, Cuba, lessons


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