Abstract
Observing the practical vertical shareholding phenomena in platform retailing, this paper considers two shareholding rates (forward and backward) and proposes three shareholding strategies (forward, backward and cross-shareholding) in a supplier-lead green supply chain to investigate the operation mechanism behind it. Shareholding’s impacts on green investment, prices and profits are provided and the players’ strategy preferences are discussed. We interestingly find that cross-shareholding can be joint optimal when the two shareholding rates are both sufficiently low and thereby Pareto region goes with it. Meanwhile, both the players’ performances can be further improved through certain coordinated ways.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 102261 |
Journal | Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review |
Volume | 149 |
Early online date | 14 Mar 2021 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 01 May 2021 |
Keywords
- Game theory
- Green supply chain
- Pareto region
- Platform retailing
- Shareholding strategy