Anglo-American Intelligence Co-operation in the Middle East, 1951-1957

Abstract

An overemphasis on the tensions between the United States and Britain in the Middle East in the 1950s tends to obscure the fact that there also existed a close collaboration between them on the intelligence level. The aim of this dissertation, therefore, is to analyse this co-operation and judge its significance for Anglo-American relations. It will be argued that the intelligence co-operation indicates that Suez was neither a breaking point for relations between Washington and London nor a watershed for Britain‟s power in the Middle East. The analysis of the joint covert action in Syria before and after Suez will support this argument. Intelligence co-operation, however, had further implications: It served as effective means to forestall Soviet penetration of the Middle East and to deal with anti-Western Arab nationalism. Furthermore, it actually allowed the United States to nurture its special relationship with Britain and to benefit from the latter‟s influence in the region without being associated with the latter‟s reputation as colonialist power. Britain and the United States had predominantly converging objectives with regard to the Middle East. Tensions, however, arose more over a disagreement over which methods should be used to achieve those objectives

Date of Award	2008
Original language	English
Awarding Institution	Aberystwyth University
Supervisor	James Vaughan (Supervisor)